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1 INTRODUCTION
A number of Indian firms (both TNC subsidiaries
and locally-owned enterprises) have made attempts
to introduce new organizational techniques based
largely upon Japanese experience. For example, a
British TNC (Lucas PLC) has a subsidiary in South
India manufacturing auto components and operat-
ing on an intra-plant Just-in-Time (JIT) schedule.
Work-in-progress is 'pulled' between production
points on ox-drawn carts using kanban cards, and
cost-reduction and output enhancing characteristics
have been significant.2 This Indian subsidiary is a
relatively advanced adopter within the Lucas family
and although much of its organizational change was
stimulated by presentations made by Lucas Engi-
neering and Systems and by visits paid to other
affiliates, many of the changes are a product of the
Indian affiliate's own efforts.
Crompton Greaves - whose experience with organi-
zational change is described below and which is
partly-owned by a British TNC - is one of about 30
Indian enterprises which had made substantial strides
in introducing these techniques by 1991. KK Nohria,
Chief Executive Officer of Crompton Greaves, esti-
mates that although the firm has made considerable
progress and stands at the leading edge of Indian
best-practice, it represents approximately 'second-
tier' United States performance with respect to or-
ganizational change and is a considerable distance
behind Japanese practice. Most of these Indian
enterprises have begin to introduce isolated ele-
ments of organizational reform in recent years.
Unfortunately there are no detailed accounts weigh-
ing up the overall costs and benefits of these innova-
tions. The case-study which follows provides some
evidence of overall corporate restructuring, as well
as showing the progress made in a large plant.
However the data available does not make it possi-
This case-study is drawn from UNCTC (1993) which includes case
studies of organizational change ma number of industrially developed
and less developed countries.
2 For more discussion of the details of JIT, kanban, and other
instruments of organizational change in production, see Bessant
(1991), Kaplinsky (1991), Monden (1983) and UNCTC (1993). See
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ble to evaluate the net financial and economic ben-
efits of these organizational reforms.
2 CROMPTON GREAVES LTD3
2.1 Corporate Background
Crompton Greaves Ltd (hereafter CGL) was incor-
porated in 1937 as a private company, being a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a British company. By 1990 37.5
per cent of CGL equity was owned (through an
affiliate) by Hawker Siddley of the United Kingdom,
and a further 37.5 per cent by a locally-owned Indian
firm (which is part of the Thapar Group); 12 per cent
of equity is owned by financial institutions and the
remaining 13 per cent by 6,000 shareholders. Man-
agement has always been - and continues to be -
largely independent of any of these major share-
holders. Thus, although formally a subsidiary of a
British TNC, CGL operates largely as a locally-
owned company, except for policies on dividends
and major strategic expansions and acquisitions.
CGL is a large, diversified engineering firm, pre-
dominantly focused on the electrical products sec-
tors. In 1991 there were approximately 8,500 em-
ployees, and CGL's turnover exceeded Rs500m crore
(equivalent to $300m). In 1985 CGL was estimated to
be the 54th largest non-state owned firm in India.
By the early I 980s CGL was experiencing a consid-
erable squeeze on pre-tax profits, which fell from
more than Rsl2m crore on a turnover of approxi-
mately Rsl8Om crore in 1981 to around Rs2m crore
on a turnover of approximately Rsl9Om crore in
1984. Its equity price performance on the stock
exchange was considerably worse than that of the
all-industry index, as well as the electrical/elec-
tronic sub-sector. Given the rate of inflation in India
also the Appendix to the Introduction to this Bulletin for a brief
definition of such terms.
Data on CGL's operations were obtained through interviews and
from a Harvard Business School case-study (Nohria and Gladstone
1991). Thanks are due to Kewal Krishan Nohria for his cooperation
with this research.
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in the early 1980s, real revenue had been falling
throughout the first half of the decade.
2.2 The Restructuring Strategy
In this context of declining profitability and growth
Kewal Krishan Nohria (hereafter KKN) was ap-
pointed Managing Director in 1985. KKN had vis-
ited Japan on a JUSE (Japanese Union of Scientists
and Engineers) sponsored tour in the early 1980s and
had become a convert to the organizational tech-
nologies encompassed within the JIT and TQC pro-
cedures. He diagnosed CCL as suffering from two
major problems. The first was its predominant
location around Bombay, where the rate of inflation
of around 15 per cent was consistently greater than
that of all-India (around 10-12 per cent). But sec-
ondly, and more importantly, market conditions
were mirroring those experienced by many industri-
ally advanced country firms in their global opera-
tions at around the same time - buyers were becom-
ing much more discerning, and supplier firms were
finding it more difficult to dictate prices and market
performance criteria (such as delivery schedules and
costs).
CCL responded by redefining its corporate goals to
increase growth and profitability without increas-
ing borrowing or the number of employees. A series
of growth targets were set:
double turnover every four years
establishment of a new plant (preferably outside
of Bombay) every three months
10 per cent of sales each year to come from new
products
one quarter of all products to be replaced every
three years.
The profitability target (pre-tax profit as a percent-
age of sales) was set at 4 per cent by 1990 and 6-7 per
cent by 1995-96 - compared with a rate of around 2
per cent in 1988 (and half that in 1985).
These objectives were to be met by restructuring in
five areas:
greater concern for customers
greater concern for employees
improvement in product quality and delivery
reduction in costs
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introduction of new products and the diversifica-
tion into new electrical-related areas.
KKN's primary implement for achieving these ends
was to refocus its relationship with (and between) its
employees and to engage in a fundamental process
of micro-level organizational reform. Significantly,
no extensive diffusion of electronics-based automa-
tion has occurred in CCL.
2.3 Redefining the Relationship with and
between Employees
KKN began by visiting all of CCL's divisions and
regional offices. Open discussions were held with
many employees in groups of 40. In the first year
1,000 employees (over 10 per cent of the total labour
force) met KKN in this way. Managers were ex-
pected to replicate this process of open discussion
throughout the firm. This represented a consider-
able shift from past practice in what had previously
been a hierarchically organized firm of 25 product
divisions, with centralized marketing, finance, hu-
man resource and administrative controls, overlain
with four regional geographical divisions. The South-
ern Region Ceneral Manager described this process
as:
...the first time that we were collectively able to
focus on what the customer wanted and what we
as a firm had to do. Everyone - from the engineer
to the general manager who has to deal with the
customers and the dealers - was able to commu-
nicate face-to-face as opposed to through re-
ports. These open-houses were not one-sided
affairs. Everyone joined in the discussion. This
had two effects. First, people realized that top
management is approachable: and second, they
also realized that the top management had a clear
point-of-view and vision of where we needed to
go.
(Cited in Nohria and Cladstone 1991: 4)
From these visits came CCL's Mission Statement -
'Excellence through a Concern for QPCE - Quality,
Productivity, Cost and Employees'. Managerial
responsibility was devolved to a much lower level
than previously. KKN's intent was to induce man-
agers to 'own responsibility' for overall operating
performance. Hence previous categories of 'cost
centres' and 'profit centres' were abolished and the
concept of 'performance centres' was introduced.
Performance in this case was to be measured by a
broader set of objectives, namely pre-tax profit,
revenues and revenue growth, cash-flow, manpower
and capital expenditure.
Perhaps more significantly, KKN tackled directly
the problem of continuous improvement which is
one of the most significant organizational innova-
tions stemming from Japan. The focus was on
instituting a process in which continual incremental
improvement would become routine. To ensure this
goals were set in relation to three measurable param-
eters: quality, productivity and cost.
Quality was defined in terms of:
number of customer returns and complaints
the rejection rate of defective products in testing
in-process rejection rates
rejection rates for incoming components.
In production, the quality-target was to achieve
Japanese 'zero-defect' practice. But recognizing the
large amount of ground to be made-up, a gradual
process of halving the target each year was adopted.
In marketing the quality target was to reduce serv-
ice-visits from a delay of 10-15 days (after the initial
request) to two-three days.
Productivity was defined in relation to sales per
employee. KKN pointed out to employees that
whereas these averaged $100,000/employee in the
United States in the same sector, the 1988 rate for
CGL was only $20,000/employee. A target of
$50,000/employee was adopted.
The final tool for achieving continuous improve-
ment was cost reduction. Managers were given the
task of preparing annual budgets which included a
number of detailed elements. They were expected to
meet a continually moving target for cost reductions.
Two other important elements were included in this
redefinition of human resource management in CGL.
The first of these was a strong emphasis given to
team-work. An 'involvement index' was developed
to measure employees' participation in small group
activities. Targets for 1995 were set: 100 per cent
involvement of senior management, 40-50 per cent
4 example, in-house conventions were held annually on a range Quality Circles. Each was accompanied by its own publication.
of subjects, including on Technology, Materials Management and
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for white collar workers and 30 per cent for the blue-
collar workforce. Small groups varied in nature,
including quality circles, value added management
groups and materials management groups. These
were introduced company-wide and were accom-
panied by firm-wide conferences.4 These small-
groups had the effect of promoting continuous im-
provement through peer group pressure. KKN
observed that:
People will work as hard as they can. They are
driven toward being the most they can be. Moreo-
ver, people like to test themselves in a commu-
nity of peers. They often don't mind failing in the
presence of their boss, but do mind in the pres-
ence of their peers.
(Nohria and Gladstone 1991: 9)
The effectiveness of this strategy was reflected by
one manager in his discussion of the effectiveness of
these meetings:
Every three months all of us can see crystal clear
how good we each are at meeting our commit-
ments. Though we are not pressurized by KKN,
none of us want to admit that we have failed.
Right now, I am failing at my budgets, so I am
shuddering about the April meeting. I am al-
ready working hard to make sure that I meet my
commitments in the July meeting. What all of us
want is to be able to strut into that meeting as
opposed to slinking out of it.
(Nohria and Gladstone 1991: 9)
A second important element of human resource
development concerned training. An aggregate
'training exposure rate' was set, defined as the
number of people in training courses during the year
divided by the total number of employees. A target
rate of three was set for 1990. Aiming at Japanese
best-practice, a target was also set of one per cent of
all employees being involved as internal trainers. By
1991 85 per cent of the firm's 1,000 managers, 50-60
per cent of its white-collar workers and 40 per cent of
the direct workforce had received at least 15 days of
training per year, Within this training of the direct
workforce, attention was given to the multi-shilling
necessary for achieving flexibility. Total investment
in formal training was approximately one per cent of
turnover in 1990, with an equivalent sum given over
to on-the-job-training activities.
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2.4 Imptementing Organizational Reform: The
Experience of the Ahmednagar Plant
The competitive impact of these organizational
changes on CGL's performance has been significant.
Labour productivity has increased enormously.
Between 1980 and 1990, output in real terms rose by
35 per cent, while employment fell by 15 per cent. By
1990 six per cent of revenue came from new products
and 14 per cent of products had been replaced in the
previous three years. Sales rose markedly after this
organizational reform, as did profits and dividends
(Figures 1 and 2). By 1990 CGL had risen to become
India's 28th largest non state owned firm (compared
to a ranking of 54 in 1985).
This turnaround is accounted for by changes in
corporate level structures and incentives to achieve
KKN's goal of QPCE - quality, productivity, cost and
employees.5 They found their reflection at the plant
level where a raft of organizational changes were
introduced including cellular production, JIT pro-
duction and TQC procedures.
The Ahmednagar plant, manufacturing motors and
components, is representative of overall progress
throughout the corporation. Changes in organiza-
tion were introduced early in 1987 with the goal of:
Continual Improvement in Manufacturing
through the Progressive Elimination of all Non
Value Adding Wastes with the Total Creative
Involvement of all Employees (Emphasis in origi-
nal.)
(Taken from Ahmednagar plant document.)
The changes were introduced first through the re-
duction of stocks of raw materials, WIP and finished
goods, then the reduction of throughput time for
motor components,6 the pursuit of the single-minute
exchange of dies (SMED), reductions in lot sizes,
'fool-proofing' - (making it impossible to make mis-
takes, 'poka yoke'), waste elimination, group work,
and zero defect procedures.
There were 561 employees at the Ahmednagar plant
in 1991, of whom 379 were direct production work-
ers, 135 were white collar staff and the remainder
were management. Whereas the 'employer involve-
ment index' in group activities for CGL as a whole
for 1995 was 100 per cent for management, 40-50 per
5Note that enhanced wages and bonuses were not used to motivate
participation. CGL salaries and wages were not out-of-line with the
industry average.
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Figure 1: Crompton Greaves Ltd,
Sales (1 980-1991)
400
200
1980 82 84 86 88 90
Source: Nohria and Gladstone (1991).
cent for white-collar staff and 30 per cent for blue-
collar staff, the actual recorded levels at the
Ahmednagar plant in 1990 were 100 per cent, 80 per
cent and 20 per cent; so by this measure, Ahmednagar
was a considerable way down the targeted path.
6 Throughput time measures the period between raw materials/
components entering the production stage and then emerging at the
end of the line.
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Figure 2: Crompton Greaves Ltd,
Pre-Tax Profit and Dividends (1980-1989)
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Source: Nohria and Gladstone (1991).
Table I provides data of operational changes at some
major work-points in this plant. As can be seen,
throughput time declined significantly in all cases
by a factor of more than three times. The value
added time (that is, the proportion of time a compo-
nent was on the shop floor it was having value added
to it) rose by similar ratios. These measures reflect
greatly improved flow of products. Since flexible
production requires frequent changeover of ma-
chinery, a key requirement for cost-effective flexible
production is a reduction in machine setting time,
and an increase in the frequency of machine setting.
Table 1 shows significant reductions in set-up time
and the number of settings per month had also
increased. Consequently, batch sizes have fallen
sharply (as shown in the table), and this reflects the
drive for more flexible production and smaller in-
ventories. Although there is only limited informa-
tion available, the distance travelled by parts before
and after reorganization and the time spent waiting
for missing components have also improved sub-
stantially.
Inventory levels fell appreciably as a result of these
organizational changes, as shown in Figure 3. The
average days of stock held fell between July1986 and
July 1988 from 85 days to less than 30 days for
finished goods, and from around 50 days to less than
30 days for WIP and raw materials. Peak levels of
stock each year fell in similar proportions. Whilst
these are significant falls, stocks are still higher than
those achieved by many enterprises in the industri-
ally advanced economies - in Japan, for example,
total stocks in the automobile industry account for
only three days production.
The ability to produce with greater flexibility is
reflected in a greatly improved delivery perform-
ance. Overdue deliveries were virtually eliminated,
falling from a high point of 300 motors before reor-
ganization, to under 10 in 1989.
The link between zero-defects in the manufacturing
process and the introduction of quality-at-source
procedures in one production cell (casting) is shown
23
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Table 1: CGL Impacts of Organizational Change, Ahmednagar Plant
Area of Plant
MI Stator MI Shaft Flange
Line Line Motor
Shaft
WMW
Shaft
Casting
Throughput time
(days)
Before
After
Value Added Time
(%)
Before
After
Setting Time
(minutes/month)
Before
After
Batch Size
Before
After
10
3
0.8
2.4
-
-
150
40
17
5
0.2
0.7
-
-
400
40
4
1
1.6
6.3
270
30
60
1
6
0.5
0.25
3.0
60
2
100
10
2
0.1
3.1
50
180
60
25
1
Note: - means indicator not applicable
Figure 3: Crompton Greaves Ltd, Inventory Levels at Ahmednagar Plant
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in Figure 4. The greater the number of TQC opera-
tors the lower the level of defective production. In
the winding section, the percentage of defects fell
from 4.3 per cent in 1983-4 to virtually nothing after
the reorganization in 1987. The number of quality
circles in the Ahmednagar plant grew in tandem
with those in CCL as a whole. By September 1989
there were 122 circles in CGL, with a membership of
1,252 (equivalent to 15 per cent of total employees)
and more than 20 per cent of all blue-collar workers.
2.5 Ownership-Relations and the Introduction
of Organizational Change in CGL
The turnaround in profitability and sales in CGL is
closely linked with the decision to invest in its labour
force and to introduce many elements of the new
organizational techniques in its plants. Given that
the joint-largest shareholder of CCL was a British
TNC (holding 37.5 per cent of the equity) one issue
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at stake is whether this ownership-relation partly
explains CGL's pioneering adoption of organiza-
tional reform in India. It is instructive to bear in
mind here that another Indian plant recognized as a
role-model for much of local industry (Brakes India)
is a subsidiary of a large British TNC (Lucas) and has
been actively assisted by organizational advice pro-
vided by a restructuring affiliate and by visits paid
by Indian management to foreign affiliates introduc-
ing organizational reform.
There is no evidence, however, that either the intro-
duction of organizational reform or its extension
through the various CCL plants was in any way
stimulated or sustained through linkages with the
United Kingdom parent. It appears, rather, that the
stimulus to change came from a visit paid by the
CEO to Japan in the early 1980s and by his personal
commitment to the implementation and extension
of organizational reform throughout the enterprise.
Figure 4: Crompton Greaves Ltd, Scrap and Zero Defect Operators at Ahmednagar Plant
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At no stage is there any evidence that this process
was enhanced (or, conversely, held back) by links
with CGL's British parent, which was content for the
Indian management to operate plants in the way it
saw fit; the consequent growth of sales and profits
only served to reinforce this hands-off strategy by
Hawker Siddley to its Indian subsidiary.
3 CONCLUSIONS
This brief case-study of organizational reform in
CCL shows that there is scope for considerable
progress, even in an LDC which has poor economic
infrastructure and in which supplier firms are often
weak by international standards. Two major conclu-
sions can be drawn from this experience. First, the
barriers to entry do not appear to be insurmount-
able. Even though India has a relatively well-edu-
cated population, levels of literacy on the shop floor
at CCL and at other implementing enterprises are
not high. And, second, CGL's progress does not
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appear to arise from the introduction of costly and
capital-intensive equipment, but rather from its at-
tention to its human resources, its factory layout and
to new principles of production engineering. Both of
these conclusions are corroborated by other case
studies drawn from India (UNCTC 1993) as well as
those drawn from Zimbabwe (Kaplinsky and
Posthuma 1993, and Posthuma in this Bulletin).
The impact of these changes on CGL's turnover,
profitability and corporate ranking are high. It
might be expected therefore that the diffusion of
these techniques will be very rapid in LDCs. How-
ever, as in the case of the industrially advanced
areas, market failure is prevalent in the diffusion of
new forms of behaviour and organization. There is
thus a clear case for sensitively-attuned government
assistance to the productive sector.
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